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Abstract  
Corporate governance is concerned with the running of an organization 
in a way that guarantees that its owners or stockholders receive a fair return on 
their investments while the expectations of other stakeholders are also met. 
The study sought to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and performance of sugar producing companies in Kenya. The study 
intended to establish the corporate governance practices adopted by the 
companies and the influence of these practices on their performance. Through 
a cross-sectional survey of 11 companies, data were gathered using a structured 
questionnaire and analyzed using both descriptive and inferential statistics. 
The results indicate that all the studied companies practice some form of 
corporate governance although the degree of adoption differ across them. The 
study also revealed that board decisions are not influenced by founder 
members and that it was not common for board members to engage in financial 
transactions with the companies. The results of regression analysis show that 
overall, there is a positive and statistically significant influence of corporate 
governance practices on performance of the sugar producing companies. The 
study draws a conclusion that a combination of good corporate governance 
practices is responsible for a large percentage of good performance achieved 
by the sugar companies. Individual corporate governance practices acting on 
their own do not always lead to improved performance. The study offers 
support for theories that anchor performance implications of good corporate 
governance as well as findings of previous similar studies. Based on the 
findings of the study, recommendation for policy and practice are made as well 
as suggestions for further research. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Organizational Performance, Sugar 
Processing Companies 
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Introduction 
 Governance is all about structures and processes for control, decision 
making, accountability, and behavior at the top of organizations. Owners 
(shareholders) of a firm have a claim on the firms’ net income and as a 
consequence their interest is in greater net income and profit. Owners cede 
control of the organization to professional managers as business grows. Further 
growth creates the need for cheaper additional funds from a variety of sources, 
hence a move from shareholders to stakeholders (Machuki and Oketch, 2013). 
Hired managers have no inherent interest in the organizations profit since they 
belong to the owners, but their behavior affects profit. This creates the agency 
problem since the managers’ incentives are not aligned with those of the 
owners and shareholders.  
 Corporate governance is concerned with the running of an organization 
in a way that guarantees that its owners or stockholders receive a fair return on 
their investments while the expectations of other stake holders are also met. 
Mallin (2010) points out that corporate governance is in the limelight due to 
the demand by stakeholders for accountability and transparency in light of the 
global financial crisis, corporate scandals and company collapses.   
 Defining the concept of corporate governance in a universally 
acceptable way is difficult with definitions varying from country to country 
(Mulili and Wong, 2011). A fairly narrow definition of corporate governance 
is given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in terms of the way in which suppliers 
of finance to a firm assure themselves of a good return to their investment. The 
Australian Standard (2003) defines corporate governance as the process by 
which organizations are directed, controlled, and held accountable while 
Cadburry (2000) defines corporate governance as a systems by which firms are 
directed and controlled.  
 A broader definition is provided by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (OECD ,1999), which describes 
corporate governance as a set of relationships between a company’s board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. According to OECD, the corporate 
governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities 
among different participants, such as the board of directors, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spell out the rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the 
structure through which organizational objectives are set, and the means of 
attaining these objectives and monitoring performance (Machuki and Oketch, 
2013). The King Commission on Corporate governance (Kings Commission, 
2002) in South Africa advocated for an integrated approach to good 
governance in the interest of a wide range of stakeholders, having regard to the 
fundamental principles of good financial, social, ethical, and environmental 
practice. The Kenya Private Sector Governance Trust (1999) defined 
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governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of 
economic and social resources for sustainable human development. Our study 
will adopt both the Kings Commission and the OECD definitions of corporate 
governance (Kings Commission 2002; OECD,1999). 
 Good corporate governance is applicable to all organizations:  for 
profit, private, public, not-for-profit, small, medium, and large in order to 
ensure that organizational goals and missions are realized through good 
stewardship of resources (Machuki and Oketch, 2013). In addition, we need to 
take cognisance of the fact that organizations operate in complex and dynamic 
business environments that require complex but flexible governance regulation 
reflecting the uniqueness of each situation arising from specific factors such as 
legal and financial systems, culture, corporate ownership structures and 
economic conditions (Onyango, 2009). No single set of governance rules fits 
all firms and situations and thus governance should be understood in different 
contexts. In for profit organizations, shareholders incur agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling,1976) including monitoring, bonding and residual losses to 
control activities of managers. Agency contracts provide for performance 
related financial rewards to encourage managers to act in the interest of 
shareholders. Tools used to enforce accountability include performance 
assessment, evaluation, reporting requirements, laws and self regulation. 
Governance provides the structure through which the company objectives are 
set, the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
(Dezoort et al, 2002). 
 Organizational performance comprises the actual output or results of 
an organization whereby they quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
actions, decisions and operations as measured against its intended goals and 
objectives as per the strategic plans  (Neely, Platts & Gregory, 2005).  The way 
management and control are organized affects the company’s performance and 
its long term competitiveness. Indeed there is strong evidence pointing to a 
positive association between corporate governance and organizational 
performance (Love, 2011). 
 Performance is a contextual concept associated with the phenomenon 
being studied (Hoffer 1983). Barney (2001) postulates that  the concept of 
organizational performance is based upon the idea that an organization is a 
voluntary association of productive assets, including human, physical, and 
capital resources, for the purpose of achieving a shared purpose. Those 
providing the assets will only commit them to the organization as long as they 
are satisfied with the value they receive in exchange, relative to alternative uses 
of the assets. As a consequence, the essence of performance is the creation of 
value. Value may be tangible or intangible, operational, or financial (Vafaes, 
1999). Performance is therefore a multidimensional construct which permits 
value to be created on different dimensions. This fact is supported by the 
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number of different dependent measures that have been used to rate 
organizational performance in research studies (Murphy et al 1996). The most 
common approach has been to look at three areas of organizational outcomes 
namely: financial performance (profits, return on assets, return on investment); 
product market performance (sales, market share) and shareholder return (total 
shareholder return, economic value added) (Decoene and Bruggenman, 2006). 
The study adopted the balanced scorecard (BSC) as put forth by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992) to measure performance. The scorecard allows measurement of 
performance to capture both financial and non-financial performance as 
depicted by the four perspectives (financial, customer focus, internal business 
processes, and learning and growth).  
 The sugar subsector in Kenya is facing several challenges. The 
ownership of the companies is complex consisting of private owners/family 
owned firms, government owned (parastatal), and corporations This has 
resulted in disparities in level of performance with some barely surviving, 
some being  under receivership while others doing very well and quoted  in the 
Nairobi stock exchange. In addition, the sugar industry in Kenya experiences 
the problem of high cost of production and global competition from other sugar 
producers. Kenya’s sugar prices are higher than not only Brazil but also the 
neighboring countries of  Zambia and Malawi yet the geographical and 
climatic conditions in the two countries is the same (Ophelie, 2006). Good 
corporate governance has been shown to have a positive effect on firm 
performance and thus this research proposal is informed by the gap that exists 
between performance of the sugar industry and implementation of good 
corporate governance. 
 Numerous studies have analyzed the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The studies have explored the impact of 
various aspects of corporate governance such as composition and size of 
boards, frequency of board meetings (board activity), number of directorships 
(board busyness), CEO-Chair duality, and ownership structure on firm 
performance. The results of the studies have established that the corporate 
governance structures adopted strongly influences firm performance with good 
corporate governance affecting performance in a positive way (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2012). Machuki and Oketch (2013) examined the relationship 
between corporate governance structures and performance of HIV/AIDS Non-
Governmental organizations and concluded that corporate governance is 
important and responsible for a large proportion of the good performance 
achieved.  
 Several empirical studies in Kenya have focused on corporate 
governance and financial performance of firms drawn from the private sector, 
local authorities, and the agricultural sector (Awino, 2009;  Abwoga, 2001; 
Gicheru,2007; Kemei, 2010; Kitetei, 2009;Maina 2009; Ombayo, 1999; 
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Onzare, 2008; Murage, 2008; Njoka, 2008) and all have  established that there 
is a relationship between firm performance and frequency of board meetings, 
board size, the ratio of outside directors to total directors, and the percentage 
of insider share ownership and executive compensation. A study by Gathura 
(2007) seeking to determine the relationship between various components of 
corporate governance and financial performance of manufacturing firms listed 
in the NSE revealed a linear relationship between performance, frequency of 
board meetings, CEO compensation and board compensation. Kiamba (2008) 
in a study to determine the effect of corporate governance on financial 
performance of Local Authorities in Kenya reported that the financial 
performance was influenced by their political composition, the manner in 
which internal audits were conducted, and the managerial approaches applied 
by the chief officers. 
 In a study of the sugar subsector, Ondiek, Kisombe and, Magutu (2013) 
examined the extent to which lean operation tools and techniques are adopted 
by sugar industries in Kenya and their impact on factory time efficiency. They 
concluded that the sugar sector in Kenya has not fully implemented practices 
associated with these techniques.  There has been very little research on the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance of sugar 
industries in Kenya. This study sought to find out if there is any correlation 
between corporate governance and performance of sugar firms in Kenya. The 
main objectives of the study were to establish the corporate governance 
practices in the sugar producing companies in Kenya and to determine the 
influence of the corporate governance practices on the organizational 
performance of sugar producing companies in Kenya.  
 The findings of this study are of great importance in theory building as 
it adds to the body of knowledge on corporate governance best practices 
particularly with regard to its effects on organizational performance. The 
results are pointing to the fact that independent corporate governance practices 
have less effect on organizational performance as compared to their combined 
effects. Furthermore, the results of this study are of value to policy 
development and managerial practice. The findings highlight the importance 
of board establishment and board functions, board meetings, board structure, 
regulatory frameworks as well as the CEO on the performance of the sugar 
firms. This should inform policy on appointment of boards including 
mandatory induction of the boards on first, appointment. Internalizing the 
managerial practice of always using the code of best corporate governance 
practice, if cascaded to firms in other sectors of the Kenyan economy, will 
assist steer the country towards the achievement of Vision 2030. 
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Literature Review 
 Corporate governance is a system of processes leading to 
organizational responsibility to the shareholders and other stakeholders. 
However, in order to grasp a clear understanding of corporate governance, one 
needs to understand a number of theories that attempt to explain the basis and 
rationale behind this management imperative. These theories explain the 
nature of the relationship in organizations and how these relationships can be 
managed within internally generated policies and externally imposed rules and 
regulations to achieve the intended performance goals and objective (Mallin, 
2010). In this regard, corporate governance is anchored in agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), 
stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1994), and resource dependence 
theory (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Agency theory views an organization in regard to the relationship 
between the principal (owners), who delegate decision making power to an 
agent (managers). The principals have neither the requisite expertise nor the 
time to effectively run the firm and therefore hand them over to the agents for 
control and day-to-day operations.. Under agency theory, managers should 
only be concerned with shareholders interests when making decisions. 
However, managers are also presumed to be inclined to make decisions that 
increase their influence and power, ignoring the interests of the shareholders 
(Machuki and Oketch, 2013). Agency problems arise whenever investment 
ideas and preferences of principals are at variance with those of the agents 
(Ongore and K’Obonyo, 2011). Consequently, owners incur agency costs such 
as bonus payment and audits to monitor managers. The board of directors act 
as the intermediary between the principals and their agents, and is charged with 
the responsibilities of leadership, stewardship, monitoring, and reporting back 
to principals (Thakkar, 2007; Ongore and K’Obonyo, 2011). 
The stakeholder theory proposes that companies should serve the 
interests of a number of groups, not only that of shareholders. This approach 
is broad since it articulates management policies and attends to diverse 
stakeholders (Machuki and Oketch, 2013). Accordingly, organizations should 
acknowledge their legal and moral obligations to all legitimate stakeholders, 
both internal and external, individual and group, institutional or otherwise. 
The stewardship theory provides that managers should diligently apply 
resources to achieve higher profits and maximum shareholders returns. It 
argues that managers are not only self interested but are also capable of positive 
actions; they have a need for achievement and internal satisfaction, and will 
improve their performance in their role as stewards of organizational resources 
to meet these needs (Machuki and Oketch, 2013). 
The resource dependence theory holds that firms can earn good returns 
if they have superior intangible resources (Miller, 2003). These valuable 
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resources become a source of sustained competitive advantage when they are 
neither perfectly imitable nor substitutable without great effort (Miller, 2003). 
According to this theory, organizations are not able to internally generate all 
the resources or functions required to maintain themselves, they must therefore 
develop relationships with elements in the outside environment to obtain the 
required resources and services (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Internal systems 
that satisfy the demands of both internal and external resource providers must 
therefore be put in place. Consequently, resources give organizations power, 
which changes relationships by prioritizing shareholders interests, working 
towards increasing their value and revising compensation practices to improve 
performance and share price (Machuki and Oketch, 2013). 
 From the foregoing theoretical underpinnings, it is clear that 
governance mechanisms seek to protect the interest of all stakeholders of a 
firm. The import of corporate governance is to ensure the separation of control 
and management of the organization. This is made possible through the 
corporate governance structures. These structures exist in an organization to 
set the vision and direction and secure necessary resources, monitor activities 
to ensure they are working towards the vision, and ensure the organization is 
accountable in using resources, report to stakeholders and meet legal 
requirements. 
 
Corporate Governance Practices and Organizational Performance 
 It is a generally accepted view that good corporate governance 
enhances a firms performance (Nyaga, 2007, 2000, PGCT,1999). Indeed good 
governance provides a firm basis for setting performance measures and an 
enabling environment to facilitate superior performance thus lowering the risk 
of poor performance (Machuki and Oketch, 2013). In for profit organizations, 
poor governance causes outside investors to withhold funds or buy shares 
therefore firms rely only on internal capital to finance ongoing operations and 
expansion. Overall economic performance consequently suffers because 
business  opportunities would be missed and temporary financial problems at 
individual firms would spread quickly to stakeholders (Machuki and Oketch, 
2013). Mallon (2010) points out that a good organization will have corporate 
governance structures that set clear mission and goals as well as 
implementation and monitoring system to guide performance.  
 Empirical evidence on the relationship between board size and 
performance is mixed. According to the resource dependency theory, the board 
of directors, with their high level of links with the external environment is 
expected to play an important role. Hence, bigger board having representation 
of people with diverse backgrounds is expected to bring diversified knowledge 
and expertise to the board. According to Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004), 
increasing the number of directors increases the pool of expertise available to 
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the firm hence larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skills at 
their disposal as compared to smaller boards. Forbes and Milliken (1999) and 
Goodstein et al (1994) provide evidence that larger boards reduce the 
domination by the CEO. 
 According to the agency theory perspective, greater proportion of 
outside directors on boards help in monitoring the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012; Daily et al 1999; 
Duchin et al, 2010; Fama and  Jensen,1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
evidence of the impact of board composition on firm performance is however 
inconclusive. Companies with more outside directors better  and there is 
evidence suggesting that presence of outside directors reduce consumption of 
perquisite (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2012 ). Studies by Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) and Coles et al (2001) found negative impact of greater representation 
of outside directors on firms performance while Reddy et al (2010) found no 
significance effect of outside directors of firm performance. 
 Corporate governance envisages good strategic planning process and 
organizational performance measures (John and Senbet, 1998). Strategic 
planning management gives rise to strategic options which are useful in 
building sustainability and competitiveness in the environment. Indeed, good 
corporate governance is likely to strengthen private investment including firm 
performance and growth. Over the last decade, the Asian financial crisis, 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Arthur Anderson, Lehman Brothers, 
Freddy Mac and Fanny Mae in the USA have come to represent the classic 
faces of failure attributable to corporate governance shortcomings (Mallin, 
2010).  
 Good corporate governance by boards is recognized to have an effect 
on the quality of financial reporting, which in turn has an impact on investor 
confidence ((John and Senbet, 1998; Kemei, 2010). Although there is a 
growing body of cross-sectional evidence linking good governance to 
organizational performance, it  remains an open question as to whether firms 
with good performance adopt good corporate governance practices or whether 
the adoption of good governance automatically leads to improved performance 
(Kemei, 2010) .  
 
Methodology 
 The study used a cross sectional descriptive survey design. A study 
design is descriptive when it is concerned with why and how a variable 
produces change in another, and cross sectional if it involves obtaining of data 
from a cross section of members of a population at one point in time (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2003).  A census of all the sugar manufacturing companies 
operating in Kenya was undertaken. The companies had installed cane 
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crushing capacity of 29,976 tonnes of cane per day. As at June 30th 2013, there 
were 11 such companies 
 The data collected were both primary and secondary. The primary data 
were obtained by way of a mixture of self administered mailed and “drop and 
pick later” semi-structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered 
to either the Managing Director (CEO), the Company Secretary, Legal officer 
or Chief Auditor/Chief Finance Officer of the sugar companies.  
 Using both descriptive and inferential statistics, analysis existing 
corporate governance structures in sugar companies and their influence on 
performance was done and determined respectively. The study hypothesis was 
tested through multiple regression analysis at 95% confidence level (p=0.05). 
By undertaking this analysis, the nature of the independent effect (positive or 
negative) of each governance structure on the various indicators of corporate 
performance was determined. Multiple regression analysis tested the combined 
effect of the corporate governance on each measure of organizational 
performance.  
 Since the study conceptualized performance as the dependent variable 
while corporate governance practices as the independent variable, the 
regression model used was: 
y1   =   b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 +………….b6X6 + ei 
Where: ei  =  error term 
 b0   =  Constant variable 
 b1 ,b2 …b6   = the coefficients of the independent variable 
 y1   =  represent the performance (dependent variable)  
          X1, X2,….X6    =  corporate governance practices represented by  
(CG1…CG6 ) 
 
Findings  
 The objectives of this study were to establish corporate governance 
practice by sugar companies and to determine the influence of the corporate 
governance practice on the organizational performance of the companies. The 
study sought information on the existence of subcommittees of the board, 
number of such subcommittees, frequency of board meetings, convening of 
board meetings, duration of the meetings, and mode of making board 
decisions. Further, five key functions of corporate governance (board 
establishment and functions, board meetings, managing director, board 
structure, regulatory framework) were presented to the respondents who were 
required to rate the extent to which the sugar companies practiced them. The 
results are presented in Tables 1 to11. 
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Table 1: Existence of subcommittees within the board 
Response Frequency Percent 
Yes 11 100 
No 0 0 
Total 11 100 
 
 The existence of subcommittees of the board was used to determine the 
structure of the boards of the sugar companies. The existence of subcommittees 
is a pointer to division of responsibilities which is a key corporate governance 
requirement. The results in Table 1 show that existence of subcommittees in 
all the companies. All the firms therefore had adopted this corporate 
governance practice. 
Table 2: Number of board subcommittees 
Number Frequency Percent 
1-2 5 45.5 
3-4 5 45.5 
Above 5 1 9.0 
Total 11 100 
 
 As earlier stated, having subcommittees is good management practice 
as it takes advantage of professional diversity. However, too many 
subcommittees may not be good for an organization as it may result in 
duplication of duties hence resulting in inefficiency in operations. Results in 
Table 2 show that 91% of the companies had between 1 and 4 board 
subcommittees.  
 The study sought to know the frequency of meetings held by the sugar 
companies. This is very critical information since boards transact their mandate 
in meetings and hence board meetings are core in best code of practice of 
corporate governance. The results in Table 3 show that 90.9% of the companies 
held 6 and above board meetings in the year 2011/2012. 
Table 3: Frequency of board meetings in the year 2011/2012 
Number Frequency Percent 
1- 5 1 9.1 
6-12 6 54.5 
Above  12 4 36.4 
Total 11 100 
 
 Indeed too many meetings could mean that the board is micromanaging 
the company and hence not giving the CEO time to manage the company while 
too few board meetings implies that the CEO has too much freedom which can 
be detrimental to the principals and other stakeholders. Majority of the 
meetings (54.5%) are convened by the board chairman (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Convener of the Board Meetings 
 Frequency Percent 
Secretary 5 45.5 
Chairman 6 54.5 
Total 11 100 
 
 The results show that the meetings were either convened by the 
chairman or the secretary. The average duration of the meetings is 3 to 5 hours 
at 81.8% as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Average Duration of Board Meetings 
Duration Frequency Percent 
Below 2 hours 2 18.2 
3-5 hours 9 81.8 
Total 11 100 
 
 These results point to the fact that majority of the boards utilized their 
time well as board meetings should normally take 2 to 3 hours for quality 
outcomes to be realized. Indeed long meetings indicate poor time management 
and planning in the form of agenda items. The mode of making decisions is 
100% consensus (Table 6). 
Table 6: Mode of Making Board Decisions 
Mode Frequency Percent 
Consensus 11 100 
Voting 0 0 
Total 11 100 
 
 The results point to the fact that issues are normally debated at length 
which is an important aspect of corporate governance. The corporate 
governance practice of board establishment and functions was captured using 
16 descriptive statements and the results are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7: Board Establishment and Functions 
Descriptive statement N Mean Std Dev. 
The board size and composition are right for the organization 11 3.64 0.67 
Every Board member has been supplied with a letter of appointment 11 5.0 0.00 
The letter of appointment clearly defines the roles and functions of the 
Board and the specific role of each director 
11 4.36 0.50 
The Board understands, agrees, defines and propagates its functions 
on an annual basis 
11 4.82 0.40 
The Board knows and understands the Company’s beliefs, values, 
philosophy, mission, and vision and reflects understanding on key 
issues throughout the year 
11 4.18 0.87 
The Board leads development of vision, mission, policies and plans 
.(The Board devotes significant time and serious thought to the 
organizations long term objectives and to the strategic options 
available to achieve them) 
11 4.27 0.90 
The Board has defined and communicated to management the scope 
and powers, roles and responsibilities to be adhered to by management 
(The Board delegates sufficient authority to management to lead 
organization) 
11 4.00 1.09 
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The majority of the Board time is not spent on issues of day-to-day 
management 
11 3.0 0.89 
The Board ensures that the organization has sufficient and appropriate 
resources to achieve its strategic goals 
11 4.00 1.09 
Proposals from management are analyzed and debated vigorously 
before being approved by the Board. A proposal that is considered 
inappropriate is declined 
11 4.00 0.77 
Term limit of Board membership is adhered to 11 3.73 1.10 
Board committees exist to advice on specific functional areas 11 4.64 0.67 
A broad range of appropriate performance indicators are used to 
monitor the performance of management.( Reliability is not placed 
solely on the financial statements provided by management) 
11 4.09 0.54 
The Board regularly reviews company performance 11 4.64 0.50 
Board decisions are influenced by founder members 11 2.91 1.14 
Board  members engage in financial transactions with the company 11 1.82 1.25 
 
 Findings indicate that letters of appointment; definition and 
propagation of board functions on an annual basis;  existence of board sub 
committees;  and reviews of company performance by boards were highly 
rated indicating that the majority of sugar company boards have letters of 
appointment for members, define and propagate board functions annually; 
have board subcommittees, and regularly review company performance. 
 The results show that engagement by board members in financial 
transactions with the company is rare. To capture the corporate governance 
practice of board meetings, 6 descriptive statements were used and the results 
are presented in Table 8. The results show a high rating of the majority of all 
the descriptive statements (mean scores between 3.91 and 5.00 with standard 
deviations of between 0.00 and 0.94). 
Table 8: Board Meetings 
 Descriptive statement N Mean Std 
deviation 
Every Board member has been supplied with a Board 
manual and a copy of standing orders and regulations 
governing conduct of Board meetings 
11 3.91 0.94 
Every Board member is supplied with a calendar of 
meetings showing dates of  meetings,  and committee 
meetings 
11 4.27 0.90 
Board members receive timely and accurate minutes, 
advance written agendas and meeting notices, and clear and 
concise background material to prepare in advance of 
meetings 
11 4.73 0.47 
Absenteeism from Board meetings is the exception rather 
than the rule 
11 4.73 0.46 
Board members are facilitated but not overtly influenced by 
the chairperson 
11 4.64 0.50 
All proceedings and resolutions of the Board are recorded 
accurately, adequately and on a timely basis 
11 5.00 0.00 
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 These results reveal the high quality of board meetings since majority 
of members have board manuals, calendar of meetings, have agendas and 
minutes distributed in time and absenteeism is not the norm. The corporate 
governance practice of Managing Director (CEO) of the company was 
captured using 6 descriptive and the results are presented in Table 9.  
Table 9: Managing Director (CEO) of the Company 
 Descriptive statement N Mean Standard 
deviation 
The CEO has a detailed job description 11 4.55 0.52 
The CEO handles queries from stakeholders 
accurately and in a timely manner 
11 4.36 0.81 
Recruitment for all positions are open and fairly done 11 3.45 1.44 
The CEO undergoes a formal performance evaluation 
at least annually 
11 3.36 1.43 
The board supports the CEO in the implementation of 
policies and procedures 
11 4.91 0.30 
There is a formal structure for conflict management 
and the CEO has a cordial relationship with the board 
11 4.36 0.81 
 
 The results show a high rating for the board support to the CEO in the 
implementation of policies and procedures (mean score 4.91; standard 
deviation 0.30). The board structure was captured using 5 descriptive 
statements and the results are presented in Table 10.  
 The results indicate that the board has a balanced mix of executive, 
non-executive and independent non executive directors (mean score 3.55; 
standard deviation 1.29) and the roles of the chairperson of the board and CEO 
are separated and held by different persons (mean score 3.55; standard 
deviation 1.51). 
Table 10: Board Structure 
Descriptive statement N Mean Std deviation 
The Board has a balanced mix of Executive, Non-
executive, and Independent Non-Executive Directors 
11 3.55 1.29 
The role of Chairperson of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer are separated and held by different 
persons 
11 3.55 1.51 
The Board has established and appointed committees 
with defined terms of reference, composition, and 
reporting requirements.  
11 3.45 1.13 
The Board has established and appointed an Executive 
Committee, an Audit Committee, and a Board 
Appointment and Remuneration Committee 
11 2.45 0.69 
The terms of reference of each of committee are 
restricted and defined 
11 2.82 0.75 
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 The respondents were further presented with three statements which 
are descriptive of the aspects of regulatory and legal requirements for sugar 
companies. Table 11 presents the results on these aspects.  
Table 11: Regulatory Framework 
Descriptive statement N Mean Std deviation 
The Board has procedures in place to ensure that the 
organization is meeting its legal responsibilities 
11 4.64 0.50 
The relevant authority is informed of important 
changes such as name, bank accounts, bank 
signatories, postal and physical addresses, board 
membership 
11 4.73 0.47 
The company files annual returns to the relevant 
authority(ies) including audit report if necessary 
11 5.00 0.00 
 
 The findings show that all the three descriptive indicators were rated 
highly (mean score ranging from 4.64 to 5.0; standard deviation 0.0 to 0.5). 
The results reveal a high regard of the laws and regulations governing the sugar 
companies in Kenya. 
 
Corporate Governance Practice and Performance 
 In order to determine the influence of the corporate governance 
practices on the organizational performance of the sugar producing companies, 
this study adopted the modified balanced scorecard model to gauge key 
performance variables. Five balanced score card performance indicators 
(financial perspective; customer focus; internal business processes perspective 
measures; innovation, learning and growth; and quality perspective) were used. 
Through multivariate regression analysis at different stages, the results were 
obtained at 95% confidence levels and presented. The nature of the 
independent effect (positive or negative) was also determined. The 
independent effect of corporate governance practices on financial performance 
is reported in Table 12. 
Table 12: Independent Effect of CG Practices on Financial Performance Perspective 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
t value Sig. 
B Std error Beta (β) 
(Constant) 1.712 1.214  1.410 0.218 
Board Establishment and 
Functions 
1.776 0.330 1.544 5.389 0.003 
Board meetings 0.490 0.232 0.607 2.115 0.088 
Managing Director (CEO) of 
the company 
-0.943 0.228 -1.333 -4.137 0.090 
Board Structure 0.601 0.117 1.502 5.156 0.040 
Regulatory Framework -0.997 0.225 -0.743 -4.430 0.007 
Performance: Financial perspective measures 
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 The results in Table 14 show positive effect for board establishment 
and function, board meetings, and board structure. High impact is reported for 
board establishment and functions (β = 1.54) and board structure (β = 1.50). 
The study reports statistically significant results for the independent effect of 
Managing director (CEO) with the regulatory framework having a negative 
effect (p > 0.05). Normally we would expect that the leadership qualities of the 
Managing director would have a significant effect on financial performance of 
the organization. 
The independent effect of CG practices on customer and people 
perspective is reported in Table 13. 
Table 13: Independent Effect of CG Practices on Customer Perspective 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
t value sig 
B Std 
error 
Beta (β) 
(Constant) -0.047 3.943  -0.012 0.991 
Board Establishment and 
Functions 
1.134 1.071 0.698 1.060 0.338 
Board meetings 0.576 0.752 0.505 0.766 0.478 
Managing Director (CEO) of the 
company 
-0.486 0.740 -0.486 -0.657 0.540 
Board Structure 0.521 0.379 0.920 1.374 0.228 
Regulatory Framework -0.711 0.731 -0.376 -0.973 0.375 
Performance=Customer Perspective 
 
 The study reports positive effect for the CG practices of board 
establishment and functions, board meetings, and board structure. The 
Managing director (CEO) and regulatory framework have a negative effect (p 
> 0.05). Further, the CG practice of board structure had a relatively high 
positive effect (β = 0.92) (Table 4.15). Issues that are covered under customers 
and people are normally external and this can explain the positive correlation 
with board functions. 
 The independent effects of CG practices on internal business processes 
perspective are reported in Table 14. 
Table 14:  Independent Effect of CG Practices on Internal Business Processes 
 Perspective 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
t value Sig. 
B Std error Beta (β)   
(Constant) 0.245 1.770  0.138 0.895 
Board Establishment and 
Functions 
1.693 0.481 1.231 3.522 0.017 
Board meetings -2.227 0.338 -0.235 -0.673 0.531 
Managing Director (CEO) of the 
company 
-0.286 0.332 -0.338 -0.860 0.429 
Board Structure 0.815 0.170 1.702 4.789 0.005 
Regulatory Framework -0.716 0.328 -0.447 -2.183 0.081 
Performance= Internal Business Processes Perspective 
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 As shown in Table 16, the study reports a strong correlation between 
the independent CG practices of board establishment and functions (β =1.23) 
and board structure (β = 1.72). In organizations, the setting of vision, mission, 
and objectives is key to success. More important is that the board should be 
conversant and identify with the strategic objectives. Other board functions 
like regular evaluation of the performance of the company and the CEO are 
equally important in performance enhancement.  
The independent effect of CG practices on innovation, learning and 
growth perspective is reported in Table 15. 
Table 15: Independent Effect of CG Practices on Innovation, Learning and  Growth 
Perspective. 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
t value Sig. 
B Std error Beta (β) 
(Constant) 1.1.728 1.971  0.877 0.421 
Board Establishment and 
Functions 
0.232 0.535 0.112 0.433 0.683 
Board meetings 0.604 0.376 0.415 1.607 0.169 
Managing Director (CEO) 
of the company 
0.272 0.370 0.213 0.734 0.496 
Board Structure 0.400 0.189 0.554 2.112 0.088 
Regulatory Framework -0.137 0.365 -0.057 -0.374 0.724 
Performance= Innovation, Learning and  Growth Perspective. 
 
The study reports statistically significant results for the independent 
positive effects of the CG structures of board establishment and functions, 
board meetings, Managing director (CEO) and board structure  (p > 0.05). 
Negative impact is reported for regulatory framework (Table 4.17). Normally, 
innovation, learning and growth is expected to be correlated to board functions 
and company management structure. 
The independent effect of  CG practices on quality  perspective is given 
in Table 16 
Table 16: Independent Effect of CG Practices on Quality Perspective 
 Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
t value Sig. 
B Std error Beta (β) 
(Constant) -3.531 2.093  -1.688 0.152 
Board Establishment 
and Functions 
1.410 0.568 0.533 2.481 0.056 
Board meetings 0.005 0.399 0.003 0.013 0.990 
Managing Director 
(CEO) of company 
0.671 0.393 0.428 1.709 0.148 
Board Structure 0.646 0.201 0.728 3.214 0.024 
Regulatory Framework -0.745 0.388 -0.251 -1.920 0.113 
Performance= Quality Perspective 
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 The study reports statistically significant results for the independent 
effect of the CG practices of  board functions, board meetings, managing 
director (CEO), and board structure (p > 0.05). Relatively high positive impact 
is reported for board structure (β = 0.72). 
In conclusion, from all the above results, the study has reported mixed 
results with regard to statistical significance of the independent effects of 
corporate governance practices on the various measures of performance. The 
results of the combined effects were generated by taking the outputs of the 
regression analysis with R values, R2, F-ratio and significant levels for the 
models (multiple linear regression analysis gives the multiple R, R2, and F-
ratio as well as significance level values). Multiple R value shows the strength 
of the relationship between the independent variables i.e. corporate governance 
(combined) and each measure of performance (dependant variables). The R2 
value shows the amount of the performance indicator that is explained by the 
combined effect of the corporate governance structures. The F-ratio shows the 
overall statistical significance of the model at 95% confidence level (p=0.05). 
The results are shown in Table 17. 
Table 17:  Combined Corporate Governance Practices and Performance. 
Model N Multiple 
R 
R2 F Sig 
Financial performance measures 11 0.350 0.123 1.258 0.291 
Customers perspective measures 11 0.636 0.404 6.102 0.036 
Internal business processes 
perspective measures 
11 0.683 0.467 7.883 0.020 
Innovation, learning and growth 
perspective measures 
11 0.936 0.877 4.160 0.013 
Quality perspective measures 11 0.907 0.823 4.957 0.011 
Corporate governance structures: Board establishment and functions, Board meetings, 
Managing director (CEO) of the company, Board structure, Regulatory framework, 
 
 The combined effect of corporate governance practices on the various 
performance measures is given in Table 17. The results show that there is a 
correlation between corporate governance practice and the various measures 
of performance. Corporate governance has a weak relationship to financial 
performance (R=0.35) with only 12.3% of financial performance explained by 
the corporate governance practice. This influence is not statistically significant 
(F=1.258, p > 0.05). 
 There is a strong correlation between corporate governance practices 
and customer and people perspective (R=0.63) with the 40% of the 
performance explained by the corporate governance practices. This influence 
is quite high as observed by the value of the F statistic (F=6.10, R=0.63, p > 
0.05) and is statistically significant.  
 There is also a strong relationship between corporate governance 
practices and internal business processes (R=0.68) where 46% of internal 
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process performance is attributed to corporate governance practices 
(R2=0.467). This is statistically significant (F=7.88, p < 0.05). Innovation, 
learning, and growth performance as a function of corporate governance 
practice has a strong relationship (R=0.936) where 87% of the performance is 
attributed to corporate governance practices (R2=0.877). The influence is 
statistically significant (F=4.16, p < 0.05). Finally, the results indicate that 
corporate governance practices have a strong effect on quality performance 
(R=0.907) with 82% of the performance explained by corporate governance. 
The influence is strong as observed by the high value of the F statistic (F=4.95, 
p > 0.05) which is statistically significant. 
  
Discussion  
 The study sought to establish the corporate governance practices in the 
sugar producing companies in Kenya and to determine the effect of the 
corporate governance practices on the performance of the sugar companies. 
The study was guided by relevant theories as well as empirical studies in the 
areas of corporate governance and organizational performance. The findings 
of this study have provided evidence that all the sugar producing companies in 
Kenya have boards of directors in place. Most of the boards have 3 to 4 
subcommittees which meet fairly frequently. Corporate governance practices 
revolve around composition of boards, frequency of board meetings, 
independence of board of directors, independence of internal audit and audit 
committee, and CEO-Chair duality. One important function of the board of 
directors is the monitoring of the performance of top management as postulated 
in the agency theory. 
 Results of this study have also established that board members in the 
studied sugar companies are normally supplied with appointment letters which 
detail out their responsibilities. Results further show that the boards normally 
undertake a review of the performance of the company as well as the review 
of CEOs performance on an annual basis. The board of directors is an 
important institution in the governance of corporations. The board is viewed 
as the apex of internal decision control system of organizations (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
 Findings of this study further indicate that the role of chairperson of the 
board and CEO are separated and held by different persons in over 50% of the 
sugar companies in Kenya.  The two roles were found to be completely 
separated in the government and publicly owned sugar companies while they 
are combined in the family owned firms. Good corporate governance practice 
demands a separation of roles between the board and management in order to 
enhance appropriate oversight and supervision as stipulated in the agency 
theory. There are opposing viewpoints as to the effectiveness of the board 
when the position of the chairperson of the board and that of the CEO of the 
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firm are held by the same person, a situation often referred to as ‘combined 
leadership’.  
 Board activity refers to the frequency of meetings held by the board 
and is an aspect of the resource dependency theory linking corporate 
governance and performance. The findings of this study indicate that majority 
of the sugar companies hold an average of 6 to 12 board meetings in a year 
with meetings generally lasting 3 to 5 hours and board decisions are arrived at 
through consensus. Conger et al (1998) suggest that board-meeting time is an 
important resource in improving the effectiveness of a board with directors 
who meet more frequently being more likely to perform their duties in 
accordance with the shareholders’ interests. Jensen (1993) however opined that 
frequent board meetings serve as a fire-fighting device rather than as a 
proactive measure for giving direction on policy and that higher board activity 
is likely to symbolize a response to poor performance.  
 The findings of this study also show that the corporate governance 
practices affected performance of the sugar companies although the degree of 
impact differed. Board establishment and functions and board structure were 
found to wield the strongest positive effect while the financial performance 
perspectives showed the weakest correlation to the corporate governance 
structures. The results support the findings from other studies on corporate 
governance. Several empirical studies in Kenya on corporate governance and 
financial performance of firms (Awino, 2009; Abwoga, 2001; Gicheru,2007; 
Kemei, 2010; Kiamba 2008; Kitetei, 2009; Maina 2009; Ombayo, 1999; 
Onzare, 2008; Murage, 2008; Njoka, 2008) have established that there is a 
relationship between firm performance and frequency of board meetings, 
board size, the ratio of outside directors to total directors, and the percentage 
of insider share ownership. A study by Gathura (2007) seeking to determine 
the relationship between various components of corporate governance and 
financial performance of manufacturing firms listed in the NSE revealed a 
linear relationship between performance, frequency of board meetings, CEO 
compensation and board compensation. Machuki and Oketch (2013) examined 
the relationship between corporate governance structures and performance of 
HIV/AIDS Non-Governmental organizations and concluded that corporate 
governance is important and responsible for a large proportion of the good 
performance achieved. Duke and Kanpang’s (2011) findings also get support 
in the current study. 
 Results of this study have demonstrated that corporate governance 
practices influence the performance of the organizations under study. These 
findings therefore offers some support to the various corporate governance 
theories such as stakeholder theory (Freeman,1984), resource dependence 
theory (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), 
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and stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis 1994) which all propose that 
adopting good corporate governance results in positive performance. 
 The findings have revealed that corporate governance is responsible for 
the performance achieved by the companies. The results further reveal that 
individual corporate governance structures acting on their own do not lead to 
improvement in performance. Consequently, it is therefore recommended that 
the sugar firms should work towards implementing and maintaining good 
governance structures in order to improve their operational performance. To 
policy makers, particularly the Kenya Sugar Board and the government 
ministry, the study recommends that they insist that all the sugar firms institute 
corporate governance practices in the firms and should be part of the 
performance contracts. Ultimately, academicians and researchers, policy 
makers and management practitioners would find the study’s findings 
impactful. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
Quite a number of challenges were encountered during this study. The 
topic of study required responses from a pre-selected cadre of respondents due 
to the level of accuracy and authenticity required. Only those who sit in the 
management boards were selected to answer the questionnaire (either the CEO, 
secretary to the board/legal officer, chairman of the board, auditor, and Finance 
officer). Since the unit of study was the sugar company and with the limited 
number of sugar producing companies (11), the total number of filled 
questionnaires could only be 11 (100% return) which were rather few for the 
appropriate statistical power. .Although the responses were indexed before 
analysis, it is believed that a larger sample could have enhanced the data pool 
and influenced the outcome. 
Several CEOs, by nature of their heavy schedules, did not have time 
for a face to face interview and opted for the questionnaire to be mailed to 
them. The researcher could therefore not interrogate some of the responses.  In 
addition, respondents generally had emotional attachment to their 
organizations and the researcher could therefore not rule out personal bias in 
the responses. 
 The study focused on the sugar industry which has its own unique 
characteristics. It would be important to carry out a similar study in a related 
industry in order to compare the results. 
 Further, the study was a census survey which generally looked at all 
the sugar companies in Kenya. It is anticipated that the results would be 
different if the study concentrated on looking at corporate governance practices 
in one particular sugar company. 
The study was a census survey which looked at all the sugar companies 
in Kenya. Since the results point to the existence of corporate governance 
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practices in all the companies studied, it is suggested that further work be done 
on corporate governance practices in a specific sugar company with the 
detailed study looking at all the operational divisions of the particular sugar 
companies.  
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